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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
Ethics management globally is a swiftly growing reality with various countries placing 
substantial emphasis on anti-corruption initiatives. International organizations, including the United 
Nations (“UN”), Transparency International (“TI”), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (“OECD”) have created a number of anti-corruption creativities, for instance, the UN, 
promulgated an International Code of Conduct for Public Officials in 19962. Moreover, the United 
Nations International Centre for Crime Prevention has established an Anti-Corruption Tool kit to ‘help 
U.N. Member States and the public to understand the insidious nature of corruption, the potential 
damaging effect it can have on the welfare of entire nations and suggest measures used successfully 
by other countries in their efforts to uncover and deter corruption and build integrity3. In the same vein, 
TI, the only global non-governmental organization dedicated to battling corruption, seeks via education 
and information to dishearten corrupt activities and fraudulent performances as well as foster integrity 
and liability to achieve better governance4. 
According to the UN Code of Conduct, public officials shall guarantee that they accomplish 
their obligations and functions proficiently, commendably and with integrity, in accordance with legal 
                                                          
1 Alexandria University Faculty of Law - Al Azaritah WA Ash Shatebi - Qesm Bab Sharqi - Alexandria 
Governorate - Egito 
2 Agnieszka Klich, Note, Bribery in Economies in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 
STAN. J. INT’L.L. 121 (1996). 
3 Archie B. Carroll & Michael D. Meeks, Models of Management Morality: European Applications and 
Implications, BUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REV. (1999). See also UNITED NATIONS 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND ANALYSIS DIVISION, 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/capacity/toolkit.shtml. (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). 
4 Barbara C. George & Kathleen A. Lacey, A Coalition of Industrialized Nations, Developing Nations, 
Multilateral Development Banks, and Non-Governmental Organizations: A Pivotal Complement to 
Current Anti-Corruption Initiatives, 33 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. (2000). It should be noted that TI issues a 
Bribes Payers Index, a Global Corruption Report, and a Corruption Perceptions Index (“CPI”) that pin-
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statutes and administrative strategies5. They shall at all times pursue to confirm that public resources 
and government’s funds for which they are accountable are managed in the most operative and well-
organized way6. Furthermore, they shall be observant, fair, and impartial in functioning their tasks, 
particularly, in their relations with the general public, as they shall afford any excessive favored 
behavior to any group, entity, or individual or inappropriately discriminate against anybody, or 
otherwise misuse the power and authority conferred to them, and committing the peddling influence’s 
crime7. Thus, an inclusive attitude to transparency, accountability, and implementing a range of 
responsibility’s advocates, democratic, judicial, media, and civil society is requested8. 
In addition, The OECD have long history in the front of endorsing good governance. That 
OECD was involved in pushing forward the 1997 Anti-Bribery Convention that is the first universal 
device to combat corrupt acts in cross-border business transactions9. Also, OECD approved a 
proposal to advance ethical conduct in the public service that encompass “Principles for Managing 
Ethics in the Public Service,” as these norms are intended to be a reference point for state members 
when merging the fundamentals of an active ethics management system in line with their personal 
political, managerial, and cultural settings10. Ethical laws and codes of conducts are extensively used 
apparatuses in the universal moral values supervisor’s toolbox11. 
In this respect, ethical codes and rulings are not, of course, adequate implements to confirm 
moral and proper governance. In 1999, Mike Nelson recites: 
 
                                                          
5 See generally Charlotte Durrant, What Are the Advantages and Disadvantages of Codes of Conduct 
in Regulating Moral Behavior in Business? (2008) (on file with author). 
6 Clark Kathleen, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government? An Answer From Fiduciary Theory, 57 
U. ILL. L. REV. (1996); Colin Leys, What is the Problem about Corruption? 3 J. MODERN AFRICAN 
STUDIES (1965). See also David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled 
Approach; The C²Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. (2000). 
7 Buscaglia Edgardo, Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries: Its Causes and Economic 
Consequences (1999). See also Cathy Cassell, Phil Johnson, & Ken Smith, Opening the Black Box: 
Corporate Codes of Ethics in their Organizational Context, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS (1997). 
8 Brian C. Harms, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm: A New Multi-
Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. (2000). See also David Kennedy, 
The International Anti-Corruption Campaign, 14 CONN. J. INT’L. L. REV. 455 (1999). 
9 Christopher F. Corr & Judd Lawler, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t? The OECD 
Convention and the Globalization of Anti-Bribery Measures, 32 VAND. J. TRASNAT’L. L. 1249 (1999). 
10 Id. See also COMMENTARIES ON THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF 
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, OECD NEGOTIATING (1998). It 
includes, the decision-making process should be transparent and open to scrutiny, as public citizens 
has a right to know how government institutions apply the authority and public funds entrusted to them 
(freedom of information). It is important to have clear guidelines for the linkage between public and 
private sectors. Defining ethical standards should guide the behavior of public officials, as public 
procurement. Corporate directors and mangers should explain and support moral conduct and 
management plans, measures, and practices should promote ethical acts, as government strategy 
should not only ignore the minimal values. 
11 For example, in Brazil, the Public Ethics Committee was established in 1999 to endorse ethical 
behavior in the federal executive branch. It is responsible for the implementation of Ethics 
Management Internationally. The Federal Code of Conduct of High Administration coordinates 
decentralized ethics measures in order to guarantee the adequacy of the Brazilian administration’s 
moral values. Also, New Zealand enacted a nationwide code of conduct in 1998 that emphasizes 
duties expected of public officials in their professional tasks. In 1998, the UK Committee on Standards 
in Public Life (Nolan Committee), issued the ‘Seven Principles of Public’ as well. 
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[…] the problem with Codes of Conduct is that it is easy to stick them on the 
wall, but hard to make them stick in practice . . . without an effective 
development and implementation strategy which is integrated and engages 
with the heart and bowels issues of concern to the organization, the net 
result seems consistently the same: that the Code of Conduct remains a 
mere piece of paper, displayed or appealed to when convenient, but ignored 
the rest of the time […]12. 
 
By the same token, regarding the evaluating role of the moral and ethical codes in the 
European Union (EU) countries, Bossaert and Demmke stated that: 
 
Despite their popularity, codes of ethics make little sense unless they are 
accepted by the personnel, and maintained, cultivated and implemented with 
vigour […] codes are useless if staff are not reminded of them on a regular 
basis and given continuous training on ethics. Codes are only effective if 
they are impressed upon the hearts and minds of employees13. 
 
Whistleblowing laws and performs fluctuate immensely all over the globe. The United States 
has frequent legal norms that boost and protect folks and entities who blow the whistle on those who 
involve in white collar crimes, especially corruption, embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, 
fraud, and peddling in influence (power’s abuse)14. Unlike the U.S., India anticorruption laws does not 
offer the all-encompassing defense for whistleblowers15. In fact, whistleblowing is theoretically 
illegitimate, according to civil service rules, and might even be personally dangerous. Historically 
speaking, Roberta Johnson opposes, that new sorts of whistleblowers are evolving who are inspired to 
serve the public interest, and her study concluded that there is no straight link between law and the 
whistleblowing’s incident and the cultural factors play a significant role in opposing corruption in some 
nations and in other countries they not16. Due to some foremost corruption circumstances and public 
servants’ misconduct and politicians, citizens are progressively aware of the prominence of integrity 
and ethical management17. Ethical codes of conduct, deterrence (preventative) procedures, 
                                                          
12 See Mike Nelson, Codes of Ethics in Transitional Democracies: A Comparative Perspective, 8 
PALIDAUSKAITE J. 2006 PUBLIC INTEGRITY 8:35-48 (1999). 
13 Danielle Bossaert and Christophe Demmke, Main Challenges in the Field of Ethics and Integrity in 
the EU Member States, EUROPEAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, COMMITTEE ON 
STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE (2004), 10th Report: Getting the Balance Right—Implementing 
Standards of Conduct in Public Life, HMSO (2005), 
http://www.eipa.nl/Publications/Summaries/05/2005_1.pdf. See also Timo Moilanen & Ari Salminen, 
Comparative Study on the Public-Service Ethics of the EU Member States, [REPORT FROM THE 
HUMAN RESOURCES WORKING GROUP EUPAN (2006), 
http://vm.fi/documents/10623/307711/Comparative_Study_on_the_Public_Service_Ethics_of_the_EU
_Member_Sta tes_publication+131206.pdf/524e908b-5388-4d1c-9199-59b4f3e567a9 (last retrieved 
Mar. 30, 2016). 
14 Christopher J. Duncan, Comment, The 1998 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: Moral 
Empiricism or Moral Imperialism? 14 ASIAN–PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 14 (2000). Dana Milbank & Marcus 
W. Brauchli, How U.S. Concerns Compete in Countries Where Bribes Flourish, WALL STREET J. 
(1995). 
15 Roberta Ann Johnson, Comparative Whistleblowing: Administrative, Cultural, and Ethical Issues, 
(Proceedings of International Conference on Public Administration 2005). 
16 David Osterfeld, Prosperity versus Planning: How Government Stifles Economic Growth, 8 
SPRINGER 2 (Feb., 1994), at 199-201, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30013417.. 
17 Duane Windsor & Kathleen A. Getz, Multilateral Co-operation to Combat Corruption: Normative 
Regimes despite Mixed Motives and Diverse Values, 33 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. (2000). 
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whistleblower fortification, and other techniques of firming the virtuous dimension of politics and 
management have stretched an extraordinary status on the agenda in several countries, especially the 
Arab Spring Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region18. 
Against this succinct backdrop, this article examines how the gaming of laws and regulations 
by corporations contributes to the problem of institutional corruption in the business world. Also, it 
deals with a brief explanation of the various concepts of CSR in literature emphasizing its basic 
principles in fighting corporate corruption and is accompanied with an evaluation of the CSR performs 
that exist in the fields of human development, social growth, and environmental consciousness. 
Finally, it examines the role of CSR in fighting unethical conduct, especially corruption, through anti-
corruption and anti-bribery programs, along with other defensive measures for contending this 
phenomenon with particular emphasis on the 2003 United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(“UNCAC”). To elucidate the analysis, it focuses on the following two sets of inquiries: First, are 
corporations accustomed with the relevant soft-law instruments and the anti-corruption worldwide 
documents?; How do they perceive these documents?; What impression, if any, have these 
conventions had on enterprises?; Have businesses attuned their performance as a result? Second, 
have corporations willingly implemented ethical codes or other internal measures that endorse CSR?; 
Is CSR a useful, convenient, and effective tool in confronting corruption generally?; If so, to what 
extent? This article concludes in by arguing that CSR should be a priority among practitioners and 
specialists in fighting unethical corporate behavior and promote a clean corporate manners around the 
globe, mainly in the MENA region. 
 
2. GAMING LAWS AND INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION: TRAP!! AND QUO VADIS? 
 
“Gaming” in its numerous forms encompasses the use of technically legal instruments to 
undermine the intent of the law in order to gain advantages over competitors, maximize reported 
earnings, preserve high credit scores, reap superior personal rewards, maintain access to capital on 
favorable terms, just to name a few19. It is one of the most destructive forms of institutional corruption 
in business today20. 
“Institutional corruption” refers to institutionally-sanctioned behavior and relationships that may 
be lawful but either harms the public interest or weakens the capacity of an institution to achieve its 
professed goals by undermining its legitimate procedures and core values21. The most noticeable 
consequence of institutional corruption is diminished public trust in the governance of the institution in 
                                                          
18 Edward C. Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 J. L. & ECO. (1975). 
See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign 
Countries: A Step to Even the Odds in International Trade, 27 VA. J. INT’L. L. (1987). 
19 See generally M. Patrick Yingling, Conventional and Unconventional Corruption, 51 DUQUESNE L. 
REV. 263, 264-71 (2013). 
20 Id. See also Ellen S. Podgor, Paul D. Borman, Peter Henning, & Jerold H. Israel: WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME: LAW AND PRACTICE (2003). 
21 Carla Miller, The Tail Wagging the Dog: Institutional Corruption and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizations (FSGO), EDEMAND J. SAFRA, HARVARD CENTER FOR ETHICS, 
Aug. 20, 2013, http://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/tail-wagging-dog (“In fact, there is an ethics revolving-
door phenomena. Those government employees intimately familiar with the complex ethics 
regulations are highly sought after in the private sector, the “ethics industry.”). 
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question22. While institutional changes promoting integrity, transparency, and accountability in state 
and economic institutions are necessary parts of any anti‐corruption strategy, a long‐term social 
foundation is required, particularly where corruption is systemic23. 
Social empowerment, which means expanding and protecting the variety of political and 
economic resources and options open to ordinary citizens, is one way to address this task24. Social 
empowerment involves strengthening civil society in order to enhance its political and economic 
vitality, providing more orderly means of access and rules of collaboration between state and society, 
and escalating economic and political opportunities25. Development policies intended particularly for 
disempowered people and regions within a country are of particular importance26. It does not include 
wholly new remedies, but rather the sensible coordination of a multiplicity of familiar development and 
anti‐corruption programs27. Social empowerment will not totally eliminate corruption; it can, however, 
provide essential sustenance for institutional reforms, weaken the combination of monopoly, 
discretion, and lack of accountability that makes for systemic corruption, and help institutionalize 
reform for the long term28. 
On the other hand, corruption does not necessarily involve violation of legal rules or principles. 
Rather, the relevant standards for defining institutional corruption include public interest and private 
procedural standards29. In this regard, Jack Knight said: “These twin standards show how corrosive 
institutional corruption can be: it involves both social injury (‘corruption by the institution’), whether 
illegal or not, and institutional injury (‘corruption of the institution’) […]”30. 
Persistent institutional corruption—including corruption stemming from gaming the law—
inevitably shapes democracy and capitalism “in a free-market economy,” including how Congress and 
                                                          
22 Id. (“There must be monitoring and auditing to detect crimes and to evaluate the program. There 
may be anonymous ways to report crimes without fear of retaliation . . . Gaming the system is at the 
heart of institutional corruption. If the FSGO program maintains its focus on criminal conduct alone, 
then it can be used as a joystick for a very large game. If a company or a government heralds its 
“ethics program” it should mean something to the public; it should be something they can trust is not a 
charade. Institutional corruption should be seen as the overarching construct that can be utilized to 
repair institutions, including local governments. By narrowing the scope of “ethics” programs to the 
prevention of crimes and legalistic regulations, we have the “tail wagging the dog.”). 
23 See generally Michael Johnston, Fighting Systemic Corruption: Social Foundations for Institutional 
Reform, 10 EUR. J. OF DEV. RES. 85 (1998). 
24 See, e.g., M. Patrick Yingling & Mohamed A. ‘Arafa, After the Revolution: Egypt’s Changing Forms 
of Corruption, 2 U. BALT. J. INT’L L. 23, 28-34 (2014). 
25 Id. 
26 Gerald F. Cavanagh, The Ethics of Organizational Politics, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. (1981). See 
generally GREGORY P. NOONE, AN ANALYSIS OF TRANSNATIONAL CORRUPTION (2007). 
27 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corruption: A General Review with an Emphasis on the Role of the World 
Bank, 15 DICKINSON J. INT’L. L. (1997) (“Societies may differ in their views as to what constitutes 
corruption, although the concept finds universal manifestations. Experts have different perspectives on 
the meaning, causes, and effects of this universal phenomenon. While a few take an interdisciplinary 
approach, positions are more often influenced by the respective 
discipline.”). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. See Yingling & ‘Arafa, supra note, 24. 
30 See JACK KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICT (1992). See also John McMillan & 
Zoido Pablo, How to Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru, 18 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 69–92 
(2004). 
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regulatory agencies monitor and control business enterprises and how markets function31. This is 
because few institutions in a democratic society—whether in the private or public sector—can survive 
in the long run in the absence of public trust32. 
Thus, gaming and institutional corruption in the private sector looks like a huge phenomenon 
and the legislative bodies has various ways to structures and designs the law (many of society’ rules) 
that may foster institutional corruption given the strong temptation for business executives to 
manipulate the law33. These ways may comprise, first, the extensive Congressional lobbying by 
businesses interests seeks not only to minimize regulatory constraints but also to preserve 
opportunities to game or legally subvert the intent of those rules for private gain34. The second plan is 
that purposeful gaming of society’ rules by business firms is fueled by the short-term decision-making 
of corporate executives and investment fund managers, whose behavior is often acclimatized and 
reinforced by perverse incentives embedded in their compensation plans35. The third proposition is 
that corporate boards of directors become complicit in the gaming of the law when they allow it to take 
root and persist as an acceptable organizational norm by failing to articulate and promote quality 
objectives or actively monitor behavior according to the standards implied by these objects36. 
Furthermore, this themes acknowledges the influence of corporations’ professional advisors, such as 
lawyers and accountants, as these advisors often support their clients’ gaming of community rules37. 
The reason for this is because of the economic and commercial benefits of retaining these clients 
overwhelm the advisors’ professional responsibility—highlighting the lack of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (“CSR”)—to uphold rules, transactions, and regulations governing business conduct38. 
In this respect, scholars and experts interested in law, public policy, and political philosophy have long 
been working to develop a set of notions that adequately define corruption in public life39. 
According to Professor Dennis Thompson, who has been studying corruption in Congress for 
two decades, institutional corruption is “a form of corruption in which an institution or its agents 
receives a benefit that is directly useful to the institution, and systematically provides a service to the 
                                                          
31 Cavanagh, supra note 26. Jennifer Daehler, Professional versus Moral Responsibility in the 
Developing World, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (1995). 
32 Johan Joseph Wallis, THE CONCEPT OF SYSTEMATIC CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
(2005). See Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Corruption in Comparative Perception, in ECONOMICS OF 
CORRUPTION, Arvind Jain (ed.), (1998). 
33 Id. See also Yingling & ‘Arafa, supra note, 24. 
34 Miller, supra note 21. 
35 Mahzarin Banaji, The Psychology of Institutional Corruption: Ideas for Experiments, EDEMAND J. 
SAFRA, HARVARD CENTER FOR ETHICS (2012), at http://ethics.harvard.edu/mahzarin-banaji-
psychology-institutionalcorruption-ideas-experiments. 
36 Lawrence B. Chonko et al., Ethics Code Familiarity and Usefulness: Views on Idealist and Relativist 
Managers Under Varying Conditions of Turbulence, 42 J. BUS. ETHICS (2003). 
37 Id. 
38 William English, What are the Distinctive Challenges Posed by Different Types of Corruption? 
EDEMAND J. SAFRA, HARVARD CENTER FOR ETHICS (2012), http://ethics.harvard.edu/what-are-
distinctive-challenges-posed-differenttypes-corruption (“. . . the solution (in theory) would be to take 
certain types of rents off the political bargaining table (e.g. tax loopholes/expenditures), and develop 
“impersonal” processes for accessing government resources. The rules would have to apply in the 
same manner to all people, and be enforced impersonally, impartially, and without bias. However, 
such changes would need to defeat the existing array of interest aligned against them.”). 
39 Id. 
37    Bezerra, E. V., Cunha, D. M. 
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benefactor under conditions that tend to undermine legitimate procedures of the institution” 40. In 
Thompson’s paradigm, corruption is defined by institutional behavior that damages an institution’s 
central, “legitimate” procedures41. Legitimate procedures refer to processes “necessary to protect the 
institution against interests that undermine its effectiveness in pursuing its primary purposes, and the 
confidence of the relevant publics that it is doing so”42. 
Additionally, Professor Lawrence Lessig has also initiated a study of institutional corruption, 
primarily focused on the public sector. According to Lessig, 
 
[t]he seeds of institutional corruption are planted when an entity’s behavior 
becomes rooted in dependent relationships with outside parties that conflict 
with the institution’s intended purpose. Institutional corruption also occurs 
when an organization’s internal “economy of0influence”—such as 
performance measurement and reward systems, and leaders’ directives—
leads people to act in ways that compromise that organization’s essential 
processes, espoused values, and intended purpose43. 
 
Lessig’s study of Congress is a prime example of institutional corruption in the public sector. 
He shows how persistent fundraising, for example, members of Congress has debased the legislative 
process, as powerful interests have become increasingly active in “purchasing public policy”44. 
“The corruption of a hard disk on a computer may serve as an illustrative metaphor. If the disk 
becomes corrupted, the computer will no longer serve its purpose—to reliably store and permit the 
                                                          
40 Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036 (2005). See also ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO 
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION (1995). Thompson draws a distinction between “individual” corruption 
and “institutional” corruption. It is a subtle, but important one. When an executive takes a bribe, for 
example, in return for some favor, and assuming the favor relates in no way to the executive’s job 
description, we can say that the exchange serves no institutional purpose and is therefore a matter of 
straightforward individual corruption. But when an executive accepts a bribe to further the 
corporation’s interests, and in doing so undermines the corporation’s espoused values and frustrates 
its primary purposes, then that executive becomes an agent of institutional corruption. See Yingling, 
supra note 19. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. See generally M. Patrick Yingling, Civil Disobedience to Overcome Corruption: The Case of 
Occupy Wall Street, IND. J OF L. & SOCIAL EQUALITY, (2016). 
43 Lawrence Lessig, How to Get Our Democracy Back, THE NATION, Feb. 22, 2010. Institutional 
corruption is confirmed, according to Lessig, when public trust falls in response to a collective 
perception that the institution and its leadership no longer behave according to society’s 
understanding of its espoused purpose. The greater the perceived dependence of an institution on 
external and internal sources of influence that detract from its espoused purpose and compromise its 
essential processes, the higher the level of public distrust in the conduct and governance of that 
institution. 
44 BEN HEINEMAN, RESTORING TRUST IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SIX ESSENTIAL 
TASKS OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND BUSINESS LEADERS, POLICY AND IMPACT 
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2010). Other recent 
academic scholarly work on private-sector corruption has focused on corporate behavior that clearly 
crosses the line into illicit and unlawful activity. One such example is TI, which seeks to expose 
manipulations of normal commercial procedures, such as transfer pricing used to evade taxes, and the 
use of agency fees for bribery, embezzlement, fraud, and price fixing. See also Mohamed ‘Arafa, 
Battling Corruption within a Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy, 21 IND. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 
397 (2011) (providing further elaboration concerning codes of ethics and corporate social 
responsibility). 
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retrieval of data”45. The language of corruption in this analogy does not point to the blameworthiness 
of any individual; rather, it emphasizes the implication of the loss of (or damage to) the data. If the 
data happen to be the only copy of a first novel or of a patient’s medical records, the corruption of the 
disk will be of great consequence46. Institutional corruption in context is clearly intended to do some 
work in the world, by signifying the importance of a particular institution and the way that institution is 
operating. It is a call for attention and for action (although it does not prescribe the kind of attention or 
action that should follow). The term is also useful in that it includes issues and concerns that other 
terms, such as “conflict of interest,” might not47. 
In contrast to work addressing illegal transactions and conduct, it is vital to focus on the 
socially destructive corruption’s aspects, as it should be noted that the three of four most common 
forms of trust-destroying private sector behavior; as documented by scholars and practitioners are: (a) 
violating norms of fairness; (b) tolerating conflicts of interest, and (c) exploiting cronyism in business-
government partnerships48. Further, the fourth key form of institutional corruption in the private sector 
is the gaming of the law by business executives, often supported by their external legal and 
accounting advisors49. This increasingly ubiquitous behavior, because it is perhaps the least visible 
variant of institutional corruption, and has, therefore, received much less systematic analysis than the 
first two50. Hence, the fundamental strategies suggested for curbing gaming and institutional 
corruption as much more work remains to be to mitigate such behavior. 
This include and should focus on confronting rule-making issues, as lobbying is at the center 
of most rule-making activities involving business51. However, in thinking about remedies for the kind of 
lobbying that leads to diminished public trust in business, it is imperative to distinguish between 
lobbying aimed at securing new rules and regulations place that adverse restraints on productive 
invention and lobbying intended to conserve opportunities for gaming52. Moreover, addressing rule-
following (“Gaming”) problems in business should be considered. Potential remedies for the time 
horizon problem are less scary than those for the rulemaking problem, but will also require extreme 
                                                          
45 Institutional Corruption, LESSIG WIKI, http://www.wiki.lessig.org/Institutional_Corruption (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2016). (quoting Professor Jonathan H. Marks). 
46 Id. See Mark Jorgensen Farrales, What is Corruption? A History of Corruption Studies and the Great 
Definitions Debate (2005). 
47 Edward C. Banfield, THE MORAL BASIS OF BACKWARD SOCIETY, (N.Y. Free Press 1958). 
Edward C. Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 L. & ECO. J. (1975), 
587-605. David. H. Bayley, The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation, 19 WESTERN 
POLITICAL QUARTERLY 4 (1966), at 719-732. 
48 MARK TURNER & DAVID HULME, GOVERNANCE, ADMINISTRATION, AND DEVELOPMENT 
(1997). 
49 Nathaniel Leff, Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption, 8 AM. BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENTIST 2 (1964), at 8-14. See also Colin Leys, What is the Problem about Corruption? 3 J. OF 
MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES 2 (1965), at 215-224. 
50 SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, 
AND REFORM, (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999). 
51 Id. 
52 Moreover, lobbyists serving as public policy advocates and counselors for their client lobbyists’ 
participation in rule-making are potentially a productive aspect of our political process. But when 
businesses or industries publicly support a rule because lobbyists have preserved ways of subverting 
it, that duplicity—when discovered, as it inevitably is—becomes a major driver of public distrust and 
institutional corruption. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET 
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010). 
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patience and steady commitment53. The short-term decision horizon of corporate executives and fund 
directors is often at the heart of their decisions to engage in gaming54. From that perspective, 
changing public policies that influence private sector behavior, and voluntarily changing business and 
commercial policies and practices within firms to encourage long-term decision horizons are the 
principal approaches to extending the time horizon of executives and investment managers55. 
On the other hand, public policy measures, in which the range of public policy, administrative, 
and regulatory options related to extending time horizons include restricting hedge fund activities in 
some way to limit the volume of border fund trading; introducing a transaction tax to raise trading 
costs; and changing capital gains taxes to favor long-term holdings56. Certain economic and political 
factors do, however, constrain all three alternatives57. Business Policy Actions (“Codes of Ethics and 
Effective Leadership”) is very essential, as it is increasingly apparent that introducing business policies 
and practices aimed at restricting short-termism and its two derivatives—gaming and institutional 
corruption—requires institutional leadership committed to high ethical standards and values related to 
society’ rules58.  Recent corporate scandals, specifically in Europe and United States reveal that 
developing and distributing corporate codes of conduct is rarely enough to curtail gaming and ethical 
drift59. 
It is a deep commitment to “quality” objectives, meaning compliance not only with the law but 
also with the principles underlying it and with ethical ideals that promote public trust60. When corporate 
boards and their delegated agents fail to build sustained obligations to such values or neglect to 
provide clear guidelines for responsible action, they put the institution’s reputation and its very future 
at risk61. The key to achieving quality objectives and preserving public trust lies in three organizational 
commitments: qualitative attention, balanced incentives, and active monitoring. 
                                                          
53 See, e.g., Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO STATE L. J. 5 
(2012). 
54 ‘Arafa, supra note 44, at 15. (“Most business executives and fund managers understand that 
extending the market’s 
focus further into the future would diminish pressures to “manufacture” short term financial 
performance and pursue 
other gaming and corrupt practices. The challenge is building energy and consensus for collective 
action within the 
collaboration between businesses and civil society as seen through collective action and knowledge 
sharing.”). 
55 Lessig, supra note 43, at 10. 
56 JOSHUA D. MARGOLIS & KIM BETTCHER, Up to Code: Does Your Company’s Conduct Meet 
New World Standards?, 83 HARV. BUS. REV. (2005). See also J.D. FOSTER, OBAMA’S CAPITAL 
GAINS TAX HIKE UNLIKELY TO INCREASE REVENUES (2010); Allen Sinai, Gap Gains Taxation: 
Less Means More, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2010, at A21 (“Presenting a full analysis of the 
macroeconomic and business benefits of a lower capital gains tax would be useful.”). 
57 See generally Peter Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Corruption 
Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZONA INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 3 (2001). 
58 ‘Arafa, supra note 44, at 15-17 (explaining the notion of ethical legality, morality, and ethical 
leadership in corporations and the linkage to CSR). 
59 Id. 
60 Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, Does Corruption Grease or Sand the Wheels of Growth?, 
122 PUBLIC CHOICE (2005). 
61 Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 L. 
& ECO. J. 2, (1979), at 233-261. 
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Qualitative Attention62. Through corporate stories, it is obvious that without persistent attention 
to the qualitative aspects of individual and group performance, the chances of developing an 
organizational environment conducive to thoughtful social and ethical deliberation are minimal63. For 
this reason, negotiation and review of personal and business plans must include attention to the 
organization’s qualitative objectives and ethical standards, such as the protection of corporate integrity 
and reputation, truth-telling, formal performance management,64 compliance with the intent of society’s 
rules and regulations, and a host of other possible goals in addition to whatever standard, quantitative 
measures the plans may require65. 
Well-adjusted Incentives. A commitment to the qualitative aspects of organizational 
performance requires a disciplined approach to incentives. For example, the policies governing 
financial incentives for corporate executives and investment fund managers require serious 
rethinking66. Other ideas for curbing short-termism include paying out annual bonuses over a certain 
period of time and basing “clawback” provisions on substantial changes in investment performance67. 
Executive officers should also be subject to clawback, so that a company may recover from current 
and former officers compensation based on measures later found to be erroneous (including estimates 
of product performance) or misrepresentations of corporate performance68. Likewise, limiting executive 
reliance on evading and derivative transactions, as they weaken the connections among executive 
pay, long-term results, and corporate governance practices, including commercial securities and 
collaterals69. Likewise, Active Auditing and Monitoring. Audits of critical decisions by boards of 
directors are as important as internal audits by management in building a strong organizational 
commitment to quality objectives and high performance standards70. Control of corporate affairs and 
board oversight is essential. Additionally, extensive and expensive documentation of internal controls 
by management, and annual review of these controls by outside accountants or consultants, is 
                                                          




65 Id. Qualitative performance measures also help individual managers see the full nature of their jobs 
more clearly. Any effort to liberate an evaluation process by adding qualitative judgment to the 
numbers requires a parallel effort in managerial development not so much through formal training as 
in how companies develop careers. If organizations elect to foster quality objectives and high 
standards, then they will have to nurture the character and values of “promotable” managers. 
Somewhere in their early careers, promising managers must be exposed to important moral dilemmas 
in executive decision-making, including the subject of gaming society’s rules. The purpose of this 
midcareer education should be to emphasize the practical requirements for retaining public trust in 
their institution. See Durrant, supra note 5. 
66 Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act on its Twneth Birthday, 18 NW. J. INT’L. L. BUS. (1998). 
67 Investment companies could also link bonuses for fund managers to the firm’s quarterly or annual 
profits, and perhaps peer-group comparisons over a three-year period. Leaders of investment 
companies and mutual funds could also base annual bonuses partly on the quality of fund managers’ 
research, and their contributions during investment team meetings. Stephen Schwenke, The Moral 
Critique: Corruption in Developing Countries, 11 J. PUBLIC & INT’L. AFF. (2000). 
68 Steven R. Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and Transnational Bribery, 
33 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. (2000). 
69 LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK, HOW TO FIX BANKERS’ PAY 139 (2010). 
70 Steven R. Salbu, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desirable International 
Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century? 24 YALE J. INT’L. L. (1999). 
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required71. Working at detecting and monitoring the societal benefits and costs of incentive structures 
will also help achieve quality goals in corporations72. 
 
3. THE CSR IN COMMERCIAL THEORY: CSR BASICS IN THE GLOBALIZATION VEIL 
 
Without hesitation, businesses play a critical role in tumbling and ultimately eradicating corrupt 
performs transnationally73. The mass media have covered numerous circumstances of businesses 
and enormous enterprises inducing public officials in order to gain a private interest (“competitive 
advantage”) in businesses74. The development and improvement of international trade and cross-
border profitable dealings repeats greater economic and gainful amalgamation under the umbrella of 
globalization75. Well recognized CSR affords several companies with a reputational competitive edge 
and is a critical part of publics’ awareness of any corporation76. Many understand corrupt deeds as an 
awkward problem relating exclusively to public officials and white-collar workers, yet this is an 
imprecise perception77.  Similar to environmental rights, employment rights, and human rights, rights to 
be free from bribery exemplify a serious aspect of the CSR field78. To inspire comprehensive change 
in CSR, public servants must not only set goals and generate enhancements in the areas of labor 
rights, ecological rights, and human rights, but they must also work toward removing corruption, 
                                                          
71 See SARBANES-OXLEY ACT of 2002, Pub.L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 404. Whatever the benefits 
(and costs) of documenting systems designed to inform and control corporate behavior, this is no 
substitute for actually looking at the behavior itself. This act includes eleven (11) titles that describe 
specific mandates and requirements for financial reporting. (1) Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (“PCAOB”); (2) Auditor Independence; (3) Corporate Responsibility; (4) Enhanced Financial 
Disclosures; (5) Analyst Conflicts of Interest; (6) Commission Resources and Authority; (7) Studies 
and Reports; (8) Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability; (9) White Collar Crime Penalty 
Enhancement; (10) Corporate Tax Returns; and (11) Corporate Fraud Accountability. For further 
elaboration on this act, see Peter Iliev, The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality, and 
Stock Prices, 3 J. OF FINANCE 1163 (2010). 
72 Therefore, in the absence of such monitoring, corporate boards and the organizations they govern 
become complicit in the gaming of the law. Kenneth R. Andrews, Can the Best Corporations Be Made 
Moral?, in ANDREWS, supra note 62, at 265. 
73 The Chair of TI Huguette Label in this sense stated that [t]he BPI [“Bribe Payers Index”] provides 
evidence that a number of companies from major exporting countries still use bribery to win business 
abroad, despite awareness of its damaging impact on corporate reputations and ordinary 
communities. See THE BRIBE PAYERS INDEX (2008). 
74 Esther J. Schouten, Defining the Corporate Social Responsibility of Business from International 
Law, 49 1/2MANGERIAL L. 16, (2007). 
75 Rhys Jenkins, Globalization, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Poverty, 81 INT’L. AFF. 3, (2005). 
(“Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become a major focus of interest not only for corporate 
managers but also for development practitioners, both within the NGOs community and within the 
multilateral and bilateral development agencies.”). The International Organization for Standardization 
(“ISO”) defines social responsibility as “The responsibility of an organization for the impacts of its 
decisions and activities on society and the environment, through transparent and ethical behavior that 
contributes to [sustainable] development, including health and the welfare of society; takes into 
account the expectations of stakeholders; is in compliance with applicable law and consistent [w]ith 
international norms of behavior; and is integrated throughout the organization.” Guidance on Social 
Responsibility, Resolution 3, (Int’l Org. for Standardization, Working Group on Social Responsibility, 
ISO/WD 26000, 2007). 
76 ‘Arafa, supra note 44. 
77 Id. 
78 See Greg Hills, Leigh Fiske, & Adeeb Mahmud, Anti-Corruption as Strategic CSR: A Call to Action 
for Corporations, May 2009, at 10-24. 
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bribery, and disgraceful behavior from corporate culture79. In this domain, various businesses have 
claimed generally that transparency and accountability lessen corruption and that administrative 
(clerical) and decision-making integrity are decisive in achieving better governance80. In this sense, 
CSR experts identify and concede that “corruption distorts market competition, breeds cynicism 
among citizens, destroy democracy, undermines the rule of law, damages government legitimacy, and 
corrodes the integrity of the private sector” 81. In terms of CSR, the government’s role is one as the 
“State Guard” within the free market (capital) economy. 
Conspicuously, the OECD played a dynamic and self-motivated role in CSR when it executed 
the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (“OECD Convention”) in 199782. The agreement requires all signatories to take footsteps 
to proscribe the payment of bribes to foreign public representatives, to foster partnership among 
nations in pursuing prosecutions, and to launch appropriate severe sanctions on firms as well as 
individuals who violate these provisions83. In the same vein, legislative, executive, and judicial 
assistances from state governments, along with civil society organizations, as Non-governmental 
Organizations (“NGOs”) and private sector establishments, could further the program against corrupt 
practices, as shameful corporate manner is an offense that is universal in scope, it becomes vital, and 
perhaps even indispensable, to craft a new set of procedures concerning the international commercial 
dealings84. For CSR to prosper, the international community must pay greater care and courtesy to 
globalization, governance, corporate sector accountability, sustainable development, fiscal and 
economic ethics, operational leadership, and business tool reliability85. Therefore, the key task is to 
                                                          
79 See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 731 (2002). 
80 Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
May/June 2006, at 85. See also Mohamed ‘Arafa, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Fight 
Against Corruption: Towards the Concept of CSR in Egypt after the January Revolution in 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Frank Emmert (ed.), 
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (Chicago 2014) 
81 Heineman, Jr. & Heimann, supra note 80, at 85. (“In the field of CSR linked to the fight against 
corruption and illicit activities in the private sector, it is important that governments adopt a transparent 
and accountable procurement system especially in developing countries through strengthening the 
judicial systems and the rule of law.”) Id., at ‘Arafa, supra note 80, at 194. 
82 THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC AND CO-OPERATION DEVELOPMENT ON 
COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (2010), available at https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf. 18 December 1997, OECD document DAFFE/IME/BR (97) 20, 
37 I.L.M. 1 (1998). For further details on this Convention, see generally Mark Pieth, Lucinda A. Low, 
and Peter J. Cullen, The OECD Convention on Bribery: A Commentary, (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2007). 
83 See generally Peter Yeoh, The Direction and Control of Corporations: Law or Strategy? 49 
MANAGERIAL L. 1/2. (2007); Fred Robbins, Why Corporate Social Responsibility Should be 
Popularized but not Imposed, 8 CORP. GOV. 3 (2008). See also Charles O. Holliday, Stephan 
Schmidheiny, and Philip Watts, Walking the Talk: The Business Case for Sustainable Development 
(2002). 
84 See Cornelius B. Pratt, Multinational Corporate Social Policy Process for Ethical Responsibility in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, 10 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 7 (1991). 
85 David Logan, Delwin A. Roy, and Laurie Regelbrugge, Global Corporate Citizenship – Rationale 
and Strategies, THE HITACHI FOUNDATION, Washington, D.C. (1997). 
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abolish corruption, or at least fighting it, while increasing social awareness86. Besides, to cultivate and 
enhance CSR, the private sector must share the responsibility, as the business community must 
become enthusiastic to combat against corruption, as that will is a spirited and central component of 
CSR in battling corrupt undertakings in business relations87. 
Ethical leadership is central if codes of conduct are to be obeyed to and used to positively 
control the proper and honorable behavior of employees. If corporate employees consider company 
leadership corrupt, codes of conduct will fall into contempt88. Consequently, codes are only as good as 
the leaders who believe in them89. It should be renowned that the International Chamber of Commerce 
(“ICC”) adopted, in 1996, a more stringent code of ethics defining strategies to fight extortion and 
bribery in international businesses90. Provisions of the code comprise a proscription on accepting 
bribes and inducements, requirements for enterprises to adjust payments by their agents, and 
procedures concerning auditing and recordkeeping and checking prohibited payments or masked 
(slush) resources, funds, and assets91. 
 
4. IMPARTIAL COMPETITIVE INTERNATIONAL FREE MARKETS AND THE 2003 UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (“UNCAC”): IS IT A FRESH UNIVERSAL TEST 
FOR CSR? 
 
A backbone inquiry that necessitates crucial attention from both the business and CSR 
communities is competitive disadvantage. If a company or a business firm is corrupting and enticing a 
foreign public authorized servant in order to execute a contract, other businesses are likely to adopt 
the equivalent attitude to continue to be competitive92. Nonetheless, today with the acceleration in 
foreign direct investment (“FDI”) in emerging markets, worldwide competition has once again 
incentivized crooked business activities in securing business contracts93. In light of the fact that 
transnational firms from OECD countries are unwilling to be the first to engage corruption because 
they are more likely to get trapped and penalized, countries in emerging markets must also lead their 
multinational enterprises toward vigorous CSR ideals in their universal marketable transactions94. 
                                                          
86 BARBARA C. GEORGE at al., The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus in Worldwide Changes in 
Attitudes Towards Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM. BUS L. J. 485, 515-24 (2000). 
87 ‘Arafa, supra note 80. 
88 See Krista Bondy, Dirk Matten, & Jeremy Moon, MNC Codes of Conduct: CSR or Corporate 
Governance? (2006). 
89 See Markus Kitzmueller, Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (unpublished 
Doctoral Thesis 2010) (on file with author). 
90 See generally Rocco Vanasco, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An International Perspective (1998). 
See also THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAW, Corporate 
Director’s Guidebook (2007). 
91 See generally William P. Olsen, The Anti-Corruption Handbook: How to Protect Your Business in 
the Global Market Place (2010) (explaining possible measures and tools for a competitive advantage 
in the global markets). 
92 ‘Arafa, supra note 44, at 412. 
93 Id., at 413. 
94 See, e.g., Donald R. Cruver, Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Guide for U.S. 
Firms Doing Business in International Market Place (2nd ed. 1999). See generally David Hess, 
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act through Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 73 OHIO STATE L. J. 5 (2012). 
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In the nonexistence of active implementation in developing and emerging markets, if 
multinational corporations from OECD countries want to endure competitive, they require to level the 
playing field with their intercontinental counterparts95. This demands mutual and collective efforts 
between CSR professionals and the business sector96. Unethical and illegitimate corporate manner 
also misleads competition between multinationals and small and medium sized enterprises (“SMEs”)  
97. Since competition between multinational companies and SMEs is constrained, it must be 
addressed in order to lessen corrupt actions from businesses at all economic heights98. As a result, it 
is imperative to mark corruption also in SMEs in order to have an inclusive policy and wide-ranging 
plan against all corruption sorts all over the globe, precisely in the MENA area99. 
On the other hand, over and again, the United Nations has wanted to take on the scourge of 
corruption in numerous legal and political frameworks. These scraps and efforts have largely taken the 
form of creativities that were not binding in nature100. One of these actions was pursued via the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) 101. Likewise, in 2000, a number of 
members of the UN signed the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 
(“UN Organized Crime Convention”) 102. Corruption activities, counting active and passive domestic 
bribery and corporate organized wrongdoing, were criminalized by this treaty103. Even bribery of 
foreign public officials is included but criminalization was not made binding104. The most recent, and 
conceptually most aspiring, international convention addressing transnational corruption is the United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”) of 2003105. The UNCAC is the broadest of all the 
assigned multilateral anti-corruption agreements to address the bribery of public officials in the 
conduct of international business106. Generally speaking, this treaty underscores six essential 
principles with respect to the mandatory and optional measures applicable to both the public and 
private sectors, covering accounting and auditing standards (recordkeeping) and the advancement of 
codes of conduct and compliance programs for private corporations; enforced and optional 
criminalization, comprising obligations about public and private sector bribery, peddling in influence, 
and illicit enrichment; the accessibility of private rights of action for the victims of corrupt practices (civil 
                                                          
95 Philip M. Nichols, Multiple Communities and Controlling Corruption, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 805, 805 
(2009); Philip M. Nichols, Corruption as an Assurance Problem, 19 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 1307, 1326- 
28 (2004). 
96 See also Suman Sen, Corporate Social Responsibility in Small and Medium Enterprises: Application 
of Stakeholder Theory and Social Capital Theory, [DBA Thesis] (Southern Cross Univ. 2011). 
97 Henning, supra note 57. 
98 ‘Arafa, supra note 80, at 214. 
99 Id., at 215. 
100 Stuart H. Deming, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS (2005), at 115. 
101 Id. 
102 See THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL CRIME (signed 15 
November 2000, entry into force 29 September 2003, in accordance with Article 38), 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/treaties/CTOC/. 
103 ‘Arafa, supra note 80. 
104 See UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION, G.A. Res. 55/61, U.N. DOC. 
A/RES/55/61(31October 2003), available at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/. 
105 See generally Ahmad A. Alshorbagy & Radwa S. Elsaman, Doing Business in Egypt after the 
January Revolution: Capital Market and Investment Laws, 11 RICHMOND J. OF GLOBAL L. & BUS. 3 
(reprinted in 4 J. AFRICAN & INT’L. L. 2) (2011). Id. 
106 Deming, supra note 100. 
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compensations); extensive anti-money laundering practices; international cooperation in the 
investigation and prosecution of cases, enclosing collection actions, over extradition and mutual 
(judicial) legal assistance; and assets recovery107. Following this serious step, the CSR program has 
innovated and accomplished a sequence of events for training pressure on the private business sector 
to reflect the social, cultural, and environmental values of their corporate performs108. At both the 
domestic and international scales, the attack against corruption has advanced and ensued through a 
gradually cohesive legal framework of multilateral agreements, domestic laws, and legal principles109. 
Until lately, CSR campaigners have largely left corruption to the jurisdiction and control of government 
and national law implementation and prosecution authorities, yet, CSR consultants have started 
application mechanisms through teamwork’s correlation and partnership with the business private 
sector110. 
CSR specialists should keep in mind that while the potential of the U.N. agreement is great, its 
efficiency depends on the level of state action111. The motivation for anti-corruption and its 
combination in the corporate citizenship plan are two of the most dynamic enlargements, as they add 
a better market integrity and hold the promise of enriched governance in the public and private 
domains similarly112. While one of the initial goals for the CSR movement is to apply burden on 
domestic governments to appliance and impose the UNCAC covenant, as CSR authorities should hold 
the business sector to higher standards of liability (especially criminal culpability), ethical veracity, and 
transparency values through health managerial actions and policy ingenuities113. 
 
5. ETHICS VERSUS CORRUPTION: WHITER BETTER GOVERNANCE IN BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS? (CONCLUSION AND PRACTICAL/POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS) 
 
As is generally well-known, corruption is a momentous and thoughtful deficiency to reducing 
poverty, achieving development objectives, and growth evolution as well. Academic studies offer 
definite evidence that corruption may extremely inhibit long-term economic growth and upsurge the 
largeness of business cycles. Given that corruption is particularly prevalent in less developed (Third 
World) countries without a robust tradition of democracy, transparency, and human rights’ 
respectability, it was not surprising that the Head of the United Nations Anti-Crime Agency (“UNACA”) 
                                                          
107 See generally Robert W. Tarun, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Handbook: A Practical Guide 
for Multinational General Counsel, Transactional Lawyers, and White Collar Crimes Practitioners 
(2010). 
108 Ibid, at 54. See UN Convention, Arts.15-17, 18, 22, 23, 24, & 25. 
109 See generally Lucinda A. Low, Towards Universal Anti-Corruption Standards: The United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption and Other International Anticorruption Treaties: Too Much of a Good 
Thing? (2005). 
110 ‘Arafa, supra note 44, at 415. 
111 Id. (“Actual enforcement and execution of this universal document will benefit the business sector 
because it will systematically level the playing-field among international competitors.”). 
112 See generally Adefolake Adeyeye, The Role of Global Governance in CSR, 9 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L. L. 1, at 147 (2011). Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, CORRUPTION, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, AND 
GROWTH (1997). See also Vito Tanzi, Corruption and the Budget: Problems and Solutions, in 
ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION, (1998). 
113 See generally Vito Tanzi, Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets (1994). See Vito Tanzi, 
GOVERNMENT ROLE AND THE EFFICIENCY OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS (1995). 
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said: “this […] uprisings in the Arab world highlighted the anger within societies at this scourge.” 
Furthermore, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”), 
Yury Fedotov, declared that: [T]he Arab Spring was “an emphatic rejection of corruption and a cry for 
integrity, […] At the movement’s center was a deep-seated anger at the poverty and injustice suffered 
by [e]ntire societies due to systemic corruption.” 
Societies antedating to see corruption cleaned up and addressed by a wave of traditional CSR 
movement are likely to be upset. Nonetheless, it looks that corporate governance conformations may 
provide a more operational and effective attitude. This is not to say that businesses should be 
observed as “evil artistes,” pursuing to do the slightest required in order to comply. Still, the data 
recommends that classical business behavior is slow to make way for the newer, broader CSR 
mandate. All in all, contributing in corruption may have some short term welfares compared to the 
application of high standards of CSR insofar as it is more meticulously linked to the prevailing 
governance controls related to director’s duties, reporting, accounting, and auditing requirements. 
Some concerns that justify attention as the CSR dialogue moves forward embrace: (a) moving 
from virtuous charitable deeds to sustainable programs to accomplish growth encounters; (b) outlining 
CSR and its role to make the business case for CSR; (c) intensifying beyond social responsibility of 
firms and building a thoughtful corporate citizenship, the concept which emphasize not only business’s 
obligations but also its rights and corporate policy and accountability; (d) examining credible ways in 
which social responsibility agendas on the native level can be conformed to match efforts of 
multinational companies and their supply chains; (e) validating the role of business relations in 
motivating business commitment in development, capturing and interactive successes, and 
undertaking the collective action problems; (f) addressing exploitation and the informal/unregistered 
economy; (g) stressing the role of industrialists, SMEs, and family-owned enterprises (“FOEs”) in 
ecological development; (h) social awareness-raising among regional and local businesses, as well as 
cognizance raising among society; (i) coordinating regulation (federal-municipal-local) and 
guaranteeing stable and regular enforcement, and (j) comforting public-private partnerships to instruct 
a culture of awareness and ethical behavior in young and future leaders. 
If escape from the underdevelopment in the Third World countries is sought, an accurate 
examination of its cause(s) should be undertaken with the goal of deciding the optimal role of the 
government in regulating economic activity. Also, intending to examine the nexus between institutional 
behavior and underdevelopment in the contemporary MENA region is imperative to take in to account. 
Last, but by no means least, CSR general consultants must prioritize the fight against corruption by 
economic practitioners. It is vital to think about accurate, certain goalmouths and policies and build 
upon the modern apparatuses advanced by the international (donor) community, mainly the UNCAC. 
The CSR drive recalls the potential to fortify commitments made by state parties by surfacing orthodox 
and typical theories into everyday business practice. So, it should be concerned with preserving and 
stimulating integrity, stability, and good governance while promising the disruption and containment of 
grave fiscal unlawful criminal offenses. It is anticipated that there is ample political, business, and 
community will to monitor and follow these strategies along with the political will, thus, contributing to 
sousing the firestorms of corruption. The struggle should be stopped at this point. This ambition would 
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be fulfilled through abandoning neoliberal prescriptions and putting feasible legal policies into play. 
And as the proverb said, “Bees that have honey in their mouths have stings in their tails and honey is 
sweet but bees sting . . . .!” 
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